deepseek

The documentation explicitly warns that the 'isolation' provided is merely detection after the fact, not a sandbox. The child process retains full shell access and can exfiltrate data or perform arbitrary actions, contradicting the implication of a secure, isolated 'grunt work' environment.

The 'Security — what isolation actually covers' section admits: 'it does NOT sandbox the child's process. From inside the worktree the child can still run arbitrary shell commands, write to absolute paths... or read/exfiltrate repo contents over the network.'

The documentation admits that the `--file` argument is not enforced and the child process has access to the entire repository, which contradicts the user's expectation of scoped execution.

⚠️ `--file` does not scope the edit. It's accepted by the CLI but not yet read by `delegate` in v1 — the delegated child always sees the whole repo

The skill explicitly admits that worktree isolation does not sandbox the child process, allowing it to execute arbitrary shell commands and access the filesystem outside the intended scope. [ensemble: confirmed by 3/3 passes; severity set to the agreed median (ADR-0067).]

The delegated child runs with `Bash` in `ALLOWED_TOOLS`... it does NOT sandbox the child's process. From inside the worktree the child can still run arbitrary shell commands.

The skill relies on post-execution detection of file system escapes rather than actual process sandboxing, meaning a malicious child process can execute arbitrary shell commands or exfiltrate data before being 'caught'.

The worktree is created outside the repo tree, and `delegate` compares the main tree's status before/after the run: a child that writes into the real working tree despite isolation is caught and reported as `isolation_breach`.

NER model detected organization in skill content (confidence: 0.59)

D****

NER model detected organization in skill content (confidence: 1.00)

D*******