The skill falsely claims to be sandboxed while lacking process isolation, enabling arbitrary shell command execution, data exfiltration, and unauthorized system access through unconstrained external API delegation.
npx skills add https://github.com/yarrasys/extensionsThe documentation explicitly warns that the 'isolation' provided is merely detection after the fact, not a sandbox. The child process retains full shell access and can exfiltrate data or perform arbitrary actions, contradicting the implication of a secure, isolated 'grunt work' environment.
The 'Security — what isolation actually covers' section admits: 'it does NOT sandbox the child's process. From inside the worktree the child can still run arbitrary shell commands, write to absolute paths... or read/exfiltrate repo contents over the network.'
Skill name or description references a well-known AI brand, which may suggest impersonation.
anthropic
The documentation frames the skill as 'isolated' and 'sandboxed' while explicitly admitting it provides no process-level sandbox, allowing the child agent to execute arbitrary shell commands and exfiltrate data. [ensemble: confirmed by 3/3 passes; severity set to the agreed median (ADR-0067).]
Worktree isolation only contains the child's git-tracked file diffs — it does not sandbox the child's process. From inside the worktree the child can still run arbitrary shell commands, write to absolute paths outside the worktree, read/exfiltrate repo contents over the network.
The skill explicitly admits that 'worktree isolation' is not a sandbox and does not prevent the child process from executing arbitrary shell commands or exfiltrating data.
The delegated child runs with `Bash` in `ALLOWED_TOOLS`... it does NOT sandbox the child's process. From inside the worktree the child can still run arbitrary shell commands.
The skill routes tasks to an external API endpoint (`api.deepseek.com`) which acts as the 'child' agent. This creates a high risk of indirect prompt injection where the external model can return malicious instructions that the local `delegate` process will execute via `Bash`.
runs a nested, headless `claude` process pointed at DeepSeek's Anthropic-compatible endpoint
The `--file` argument is accepted by the CLI but not enforced, meaning the child agent has access to the entire repository despite the user's expectation of scoped access.
⚠️ `--file` is accepted but not yet enforced in v1 — see below.
NER model detected organization in skill content (confidence: 0.59)
D****
NER model detected organization in skill content (confidence: 1.00)
D*******
User confirmation bypass detected — attempts to skip human oversight
auto-approve
Skill does not specify a license field. Specifying a license helps users understand usage terms.
[](https://mondoo.com/ai-agent-security/skills/github/yarrasys/extensions/deepseek)<a href="https://mondoo.com/ai-agent-security/skills/github/yarrasys/extensions/deepseek"><img src="https://mondoo.com/ai-agent-security/api/badge/github/yarrasys/extensions/deepseek.svg" alt="Mondoo Skill Check" /></a>https://mondoo.com/ai-agent-security/api/badge/github/yarrasys/extensions/deepseek.svgSkills can read files, run commands, and access credentials. Mondoo helps organizations manage the security risks of AI agent skills across their entire fleet.