70High

The skill falsely claims to be sandboxed while lacking process isolation, enabling arbitrary shell command execution, data exfiltration, and unauthorized system access through unconstrained external API delegation.

Threat Analysis

AI Agent Traps ↗Scanned 7/24/2026
Content InjectionPerceptionclean
Cognitive StateMemory & Learningclean
SystemicMulti-Agent Dynamics1 finding
Human-in-the-LoopHuman Overseerclean
HygienePackaging & Manifest1 finding

Skill Info

Nameyarrasys/extensions/deepseek
Registrygithub
Version1f97dc32a775
PURLpkg:github/yarrasys/extensions@1f97dc32a775?skill=deepseek
Stars1
SHA-25629265e08ef11...
SHA-1f435c9982fee...
MD5be0ca83ed32d...
TLSHfa2218fb6a84...
ssdeep192:9q5J463B...
Size10,280 bytes

Install

This skill has been flagged as potentially malicious. Review the findings below before installing.
GitHub
GitHub
Skills.sh
Skills.shDocs
npx skills add https://github.com/yarrasys/extensions

Assessments (5)

AI Agent Traps ↗
Description Mismatchhighdescription mismatchAML.T0011.000LLM06:2025LLM09:2025

The documentation explicitly warns that the 'isolation' provided is merely detection after the fact, not a sandbox. The child process retains full shell access and can exfiltrate data or perform arbitrary actions, contradicting the implication of a secure, isolated 'grunt work' environment.

85% confidence
The 'Security — what isolation actually covers' section admits: 'it does NOT sandbox the child's process. From inside the worktree the child can still run arbitrary shell commands, write to absolute paths... or read/exfiltrate repo contents over the network.'
Potential brand impersonationmediumsocial engineeringAML.T0052.000LLM09:2025

Skill name or description references a well-known AI brand, which may suggest impersonation.

70% confidence
anthropic
False sense of security regarding isolationhighoversight evasionAML.T0054LLM01:2025LLM07:2025

The documentation frames the skill as 'isolated' and 'sandboxed' while explicitly admitting it provides no process-level sandbox, allowing the child agent to execute arbitrary shell commands and exfiltrate data. [ensemble: confirmed by 3/3 passes; severity set to the agreed median (ADR-0067).]

90% confidence
Worktree isolation only contains the child's git-tracked file diffs — it does not sandbox the child's process. From inside the worktree the child can still run arbitrary shell commands, write to absolute paths outside the worktree, read/exfiltrate repo contents over the network.
Insecure sandbox architecturehighcommand executionAML.T0050AML.T0053AML.T0072LLM05:2025LLM06:2025

The skill explicitly admits that 'worktree isolation' is not a sandbox and does not prevent the child process from executing arbitrary shell commands or exfiltrating data.

100% confidence
The delegated child runs with `Bash` in `ALLOWED_TOOLS`... it does NOT sandbox the child's process. From inside the worktree the child can still run arbitrary shell commands.
Implicit trust in external API endpointhighindirect prompt injection

The skill routes tasks to an external API endpoint (`api.deepseek.com`) which acts as the 'child' agent. This creates a high risk of indirect prompt injection where the external model can return malicious instructions that the local `delegate` process will execute via `Bash`.

90% confidenceline 8
runs a nested, headless `claude` process pointed at DeepSeek's Anthropic-compatible endpoint
Unenforced security constraintsmediumdescription mismatchAML.T0011.000LLM06:2025LLM09:2025

The `--file` argument is accepted by the CLI but not enforced, meaning the child agent has access to the entire repository despite the user's expectation of scoped access.

100% confidence
⚠️ `--file` is accepted but not yet enforced in v1 — see below.
Organization name detectedmediumpii exposureAML.T0024LLM02:2025

NER model detected organization in skill content (confidence: 0.59)

59% confidence
D****
Organization name detectedmediumpii exposureAML.T0024LLM02:2025

NER model detected organization in skill content (confidence: 1.00)

100% confidence
D*******
User confirmation bypass detected — attempts to skip human oversightmediumautonomy abuseAML.T0034.002AML.T0053LLM06:2025LLM10:2025

User confirmation bypass detected — attempts to skip human oversight

95% confidenceline 118
auto-approve
Missing allowed-tools declarationlowunauthorized tool useAML.T0053LLM06:2025

Skill executes commands, writes files, or accesses the network but declares no allowed-tools, so its tool surface cannot be reviewed or constrained.

90% confidence
Missing licenseinfopolicy violation

Skill does not specify a license field. Specifying a license helps users understand usage terms.

100% confidence

Badge

Skill Check badge
Markdown
[![Mondoo Skill Check](https://mondoo.com/ai-agent-security/api/badge/github/yarrasys/extensions/deepseek.svg)](https://mondoo.com/ai-agent-security/skills/github/yarrasys/extensions/deepseek)
HTML
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Image URL
https://mondoo.com/ai-agent-security/api/badge/github/yarrasys/extensions/deepseek.svg

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