A Stored Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in MobSF's Android manifest analysis allows an attacker to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of a victim's browser session by uploading a malicious APK. The android:host attribute from <data android:scheme="android_secret_code"> elements is rendered in HTML reports without sanitization, enabling session hijacking and account takeover.
When MobSF analyzes an Android APK containing a <data> element with android:scheme="android_secret_code", it extracts the android:host attribute and inserts it directly into the analysis report without HTML escaping.
1. Data Extraction - mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/views/android/manifest_analysis.py (line 776):
xmlhost = data.getAttribute(f'{ns}:host')
ret_list.append(('dialer_code_found', (xmlhost,), ()))
2. Template String Formatting - mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/views/android/manifest_analysis.py (line 806):
'title': a_template['title'] % t_name, # XSS payload inserted here unescaped
3. Template Definition - mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/views/android/kb/android_manifest_desc.py (line 200):
'dialer_code_found': {
'title': 'Dailer Code: %s Found <br>[android:scheme=\"android_secret_code\"]',
...
}
4. Unsafe Rendering - mobsf/templates/static_analysis/android_binary_analysis.html (line 1143):
{{item|key:"title" | safe}}
The |safe Django template filter bypasses auto-escaping, allowing the unescaped android:host value to be rendered as raw HTML.
Create an APK with the following AndroidManifest.xml:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android"
package="com.poc.xsstest"
android:versionCode="1"
android:versionName="1.0">
<application android:label="XSS PoC Test">
<receiver android:name=".SecretCodeReceiver"...
3.2.63.2.73.2.83.2.93.3.33.3.53.4.03.4.33.4.63.5.0+9 more4.4.5Exploitability
AV:NAC:LPR:HUI:RScope
S:CImpact
C:HI:HA:NCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N