MAL-2026-11067

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Source: amazon-inspector (82efbe82f1f4cdc513a33b4deeb7a811318155aaf4de1d4319dc54f8730f409b)

The package name matches Lyft's internal python-blessclient and is published on the public index as a dependency-confusion tripwire. setup.py overrides the install command class (InstallWithCanary) to issue an HTTP GET to http://canarytokens.com/about/static/obeoafaz522zscu7248tqu4rh/submit.aspx during pip install, and blessclient/__init__.py fires the same beacon at import time via urllib.request.urlopen(_CANARY_URL). The beacon body carries only what an ordinary HTTP GET reveals (source IP, User-Agent); no environment variables, filesystem contents, or credentials are read or transmitted, and no code is fetched or executed. The destination is the canarytokens.com research service rather than attacker-controlled infrastructure. Installing this package discloses the fact and source of the install to whoever configured the canary token, and executes network I/O at install and import time without opt-out.

Source: kam193 (cce3c8791da7093bb0d6aaf8b79f49e5cbbcc4114f075f60121fc99b31c74e09)

Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.

Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.

Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest

Reasons (based on the campaign):

• The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.

• The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.