NLTK 3.10.3 contains security hardening intended to close JVM argument-injection and untrusted JAR/classpath execution paths in nltk.internals.java(), including the issue published as GHSA-m4rf-3fr8-xwx3.
The patched options channel correctly rejects Java argument-file references such as @/path/to/args and launcher modes such as -jar. However, an additional argument channel remains: the caller-provided cmd sequence is appended to the Java command after the validated option and classpath channels, without enforcing that its first item is a Java main-class name.
I am reporting this as an additional post-fix bypass / incomplete-fix path affecting the 3.10.3 remediation, rather than as an unrelated vulnerability family.
As a result, the same launcher token that is rejected through options can be supplied as the first cmd item. I confirmed two reachable forms against the official nltk-3.10.3-py3-none-any.whl:
nltk.internals.java() helper with cmd=["-jar", ...]; andStanfordSegmenter, whose public java_class constructor argument becomes the first cmd item and accepts an @argfile launcher token.Both paths execute an external researcher-controlled JAR without setting NLTK_ALLOW_UNSAFE_JARS, NLTK_ALLOW_UNSAFE_CLASSPATH, or using trusted_raw_options. The original explicit outside-classpath route is blocked in 3.10.3, while the alternate command channel executes the JAR 3/3 times.
Package: nltk
Confirmed affected version: 3.10.3
Wheel: nltk-3.10.3-py3-none-any.whl
SHA-256: ff9598a8e20518ee0d557745890cc4435b9578489e2dcbc69c4f81fa060caf7c
Baseline artifact:
Version: 3.10.2
Wheel: nltk-3.10.2-py3-none-any.whl
SHA-256: 2c7ccacb765c5e26b0cb60fb1b57080af522c6924d12a714a243305ba3637412
The existing 3.10.3 hardening validates the dedicated per-call options list before it reaches...
3.10.4Exploitability
AV:NAC:LPR:NUI:NScope
S:UImpact
C:HI:HA:H9.8/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HInput Validation
Other