Open WebUI v0.9.5 lets an authenticated user attach arbitrary file_id values to their own chat message without checking whether they own or can read those files. If the attacker then shares that chat and grants themselves read access, has_access_to_file() treats the victim file as accessible through the shared chat, and the file endpoints read or delete the victim file.
Security boundary crossed: file confidentiality and integrity.
An authenticated attacker who knows or obtains a victim file_id can make Open WebUI authorize, through an attacker-owned shared chat:
GET /api/v1/files/{id}/content, andDELETE /api/v1/files/{id}.Client-controlled message file IDs are persisted without file authorization checks:
# backend/open_webui/main.py
await Chats.insert_chat_files(
chat_id,
user_message.get('id'),
[
file_item.get('id')
for file_item in user_message_files
if file_item.get('type') == 'file'
],
user.id,
)
insert_chat_files() stores the provided IDs directly:
# backend/open_webui/models/chats.py
ChatFileModel(
user_id=user_id,
chat_id=chat_id,
message_id=message_id,
file_id=file_id,
)
Later, file authorization trusts shared-chat associations:
# backend/open_webui/utils/access_control/files.py
shared_chat_ids = await Chats.get_shared_chat_ids_by_file_id(file_id, db=db)
if shared_chat_ids:
accessible_ids = await AccessGrants.get_accessible_resource_ids(
user_id=user.id,
resource_type='shared_chat',
resource_ids=shared_chat_ids,
permission='read',
)
if accessible_ids:
return True
The download endpoint uses this helper:
# backend/open_webui/routers/files.py
if file.user_id == user.id or user.role == 'admin' or await has_access_to_file(id, 'read', user, db=db):
return...
0.9.6Exploitability
AV:NAC:LPR:LUI:NScope
S:UImpact
C:HI:HA:L8.3/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L