There is a server-side channel state issue in russh.
After a client is authenticated, russh can dispatch channel-scoped handler callbacks for recipient channel IDs that were never opened or confirmed. In the strongest reproduced case, the client does not send SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN at all. It authenticates normally, then sends SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST packets with request type exec for a range of recipient channel IDs. russh still calls the server application's exec_request handler.
This is not an authentication bypass. A valid login is required. The issue is that the SSH channel lifecycle is not enforced before channel-scoped callbacks are delivered to the application.
An authenticated client can bypass the server application's channel-open policy.
A server may deny session channels by returning false from Handler::channel_open_session. A server may also assume that callbacks such as exec_request, shell_request, subsystem_request, data, channel_eof, or channel_close are only delivered for channels that were opened and confirmed by the SSH transport layer.
That assumption does not hold in the vulnerable path. A malicious authenticated peer can send channel-scoped messages for arbitrary recipient channel IDs and cause handler callbacks to run even though no channel exists.
The exact impact depends on the downstream application. For many SSH server use cases, exec_request, shell_request, or subsystem_request start commands, jobs, shells, SFTP-like subsystems, internal workflows, or other state-changing operations. In the PoC, the protected exec_request action runs even though no channel was opened.
SSH channel requests are not global post-authentication requests. They are operations on an existing channel.
RFC 4254 describes channel-specific messages as carrying a recipient channel number. The exec request is a SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST for a session channel. That means the...
0.62.5Exploitability
AV:NAC:LPR:LUI:NScope
S:UImpact
C:NI:HA:N6.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:NAccess Control