Langflow uses Python's random module (Mersenne Twister, a non-cryptographic PRNG) seeded with the SECRET_KEY to derive the Fernet encryption key for all stored user credentials (API keys, LLM provider secrets, database passwords). When the SECRET_KEY is shorter than 32 characters — a common scenario for self-hosted deployments using simple/memorable secrets — the derived encryption key is fully deterministic and reproducible by anyone who knows the seed value. An attacker who obtains the SECRET_KEY (e.g., via the MCP path traversal in this repo) can reconstruct the exact Fernet key offline and decrypt every credential stored in the database with no brute force required.
Even when SECRET_KEY is 32+ characters (the "safe" branch), the raw key material is used directly as the Fernet key — meaning exfiltrating the secret_key file is sufficient to decrypt all credentials without any additional computation.
Severity: Critical — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N (9.1) CWE-338: Weak PRNG | CWE-321: Hard-coded Cryptographic Key | CWE-311: Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data
Root cause: src/backend/base/langflow/services/auth/service.py, lines 651–663
MINIMUM_KEY_LENGTH = 32
def _ensure_valid_key(self, raw_key: str) -> bytes:
if len(raw_key) < MINIMUM_KEY_LENGTH:
random.seed(raw_key) # Non-cryptographic PRNG seeded with the secret
key = bytes(random.getrandbits(8) for _ in range(32)) # Fully deterministic output
key = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(key)
else:
key = self._add_padding(raw_key).encode() # Raw secret IS the Fernet key
return key
def _get_fernet(self) -> Fernet:
secret_key = self.settings.auth_settings.SECRET_KEY.get_secret_value()
valid_key = self._ensure_valid_key(secret_key)
return Fernet(valid_key)
The identical logic is duplicated in...
1.10.1Exploitability
AV:NAC:LPR:NUI:NScope
S:UImpact
C:HI:HA:N9.1/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:NOther