objects/getCaptcha.php accepts the CAPTCHA length (ql) directly from the query string with no clamping or sanitization, letting any unauthenticated client force the server to generate a 1-character CAPTCHA word. Combined with a case-insensitive strcasecmp comparison over a ~33-character alphabet and the fact that failed validations do NOT consume the stored session token, an attacker can trivially brute-force the CAPTCHA on any endpoint that relies on Captcha::validation() (user registration, password recovery, contact form, etc.) in at most ~33 requests per session.
Three cooperating flaws in objects/getCaptcha.php and objects/captcha.php reduce CAPTCHA protection to a deterministic bypass.
objects/getCaptcha.php:7)$largura = empty($_GET['l']) ? 120 : $_GET['l'];
$altura = empty($_GET['a']) ? 40 : $_GET['a'];
$tamanho_fonte = empty($_GET['tf']) ? 18 : $_GET['tf'];
$quantidade_letras = empty($_GET['ql']) ? 5 : $_GET['ql']; // attacker-controlled
$capcha = new Captcha($largura, $altura, $tamanho_fonte, $quantidade_letras);
$capcha->getCaptchaImage();
There is no minimum, no type-check, and no clamping. Requesting /objects/getCaptcha.php?ql=1 causes the server to generate a single-character word and save it to the attacker's own PHP session.
objects/captcha.php:33-39)$letters = 'AaBbCcDdEeFfGgHhIiJjKkLlMmNnPpQqRrSsTtUuVvYyXxWwZz23456789';
$palavra = substr(str_shuffle($letters), 0, ($this->quantidade_letras));
if (User::isAdmin() && empty($_REQUEST['forceCaptcha'])) {
$palavra = "admin";
}
_session_start();
$_SESSION["palavra"] = $palavra;
After case-folding the alphabet is 25 letters (A–Z minus O) plus digits 2-9, i.e. 33 unique values. For an unauthenticated attacker the admin branch at line 35 is unreachable, so the value is purely random over that 33-symbol set.
Exploitability
AV:NAC:LPR:NUI:NScope
S:UImpact
C:NI:LA:N5.3/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:NOther