PraisonAI's AgentOS FastAPI deployment surface remains unauthenticated in
current main and in releases after the published patched version for
GHSA-pm96-6xpr-978x / CVE-2026-40151.
The public AgentOS advisory is published as an instruction-disclosure issue
with affected versions < 4.5.128 and patched version 4.5.128. However,
v4.5.128, latest release v4.6.57, and current main still register
GET /api/agents and POST /api/chat without authentication. The chat route
directly calls agent.chat(request.message). No-auth and wrong-bearer requests
both execute the deployed agent.
This is broader than passive metadata disclosure. In any deployment where AgentOS wraps agents with tools, private context, memory, API integrations, or cost-bearing model calls, an unauthenticated reachable client can drive those agents.
MervinPraison/PraisonAIpraisonaisrc/praisonai/praisonai/app/agentos.pysrc/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/app/config.pyGHSA-pm96-6xpr-978x /
CVE-2026-40151Confirmed affected dynamically:
v4.5.126v4.5.128 (published patched version for GHSA-pm96-6xpr-978x)v4.6.9v4.6.10v4.6.56v4.6.572f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1Static source review found the same unauthenticated route pattern and
0.0.0.0 default in v4.2.1.
Suggested affected range: >= 4.2.1, <= 4.6.57.
AgentOSConfig / AgentAppConfig defaults the deployment host to all
interfaces and has no authentication fields:
name: str = "PraisonAI App"
host: str = "0.0.0.0"
port: int = 8000
api_prefix: str = "/api"
AgentOS._register_routes() registers public agent metadata and chat routes
without middleware, dependency, API key check,...
4.6.59Exploitability
AV:NAC:LPR:NUI:NScope
S:UImpact
C:HI:HA:H9.8/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H