GHSA-7qw2-w5rc-37x2

Summary

PraisonAI recipe execution has a dangerous-tool policy that is supposed to block default-denied tools unless the caller explicitly passes allow_dangerous_tools=True. That policy only checks tools declared in TEMPLATE.yaml requires.tools.

For steps-based recipes, the actual execution path loads workflow.yaml with YAMLWorkflowParser. That parser resolves agent-level tools: declarations and preserves top-level approve:. Workflow.start() then installs those YAML-approved tools into the approval context.

As a result, an untrusted recipe can omit execute_command from TEMPLATE.yaml requires.tools, declare it in workflow.yaml agents.*.tools, and add top-level approve: [execute_command]. The caller did not set allow_dangerous_tools=True, but the recipe policy allows the recipe and the workflow approval path self-approves the critical shell tool.

The local PoV uses a harmless printf canary and explicitly unsets PRAISONAI_AUTO_APPROVE.

Technical Details

recipe.run() checks the recipe policy unless options["allow_dangerous_tools"] is true. _check_tool_policy() gets the required tool list from recipe_config.get_required_tools(), which is backed by TEMPLATE.yaml requires.tools.

The steps workflow execution path is separate:

1. _execute_steps_workflow() parses the workflow file with YAMLWorkflowParser.
2. YAMLWorkflowParser resolves agents.*.tools.
3. The same parser reads top-level approve: and stores it on workflow.approve_tools.
4. Workflow.start() calls set_yaml_approved_tools(approve_tools).
5. The approval registry treats YAML-approved tools as approved.

execute_command is listed as a default dangerous tool with critical risk and is decorated with @require_approval(risk_level="critical"). The policy gap is that recipe-level dangerous-tool enforcement does not inspect the workflow file that actually supplies and approves the tool.

Why This Is Not Intended Behavior

YAML approve: is...