banks parses Tool JSON objects from the rendered body of {% completion %} blocks and later resolves their
import_path field through importlib.import_module(...) + getattr(...) to obtain the callable that handles a tool
call. There is no allowlist or sanitization on import_path, so any importable Python attribute (e.g. os.system,
subprocess.getoutput) can be selected. When the LLM emits a tool_calls entry whose function.name matches the
attacker-supplied tool name, the resolved callable is invoked with kwargs decoded from tool_call.function.arguments,
yielding arbitrary code execution in the banks-hosting process.
This is distinct from GHSA-gphh-9q3h-jgpp / CVE-2026-44209. That advisory was fixed in 2.4.2 by switching
src/banks/env.py from Environment to SandboxedEnvironment. The fix does not touch
src/banks/extensions/completion.py, and the unsafe import + getattr chain still executes on 2.4.2. The malicious
Tool JSON is plain text in the rendered template body — it requires no Jinja attribute access, so the sandbox is
irrelevant.
src/banks/extensions/completion.py:79-98
def _get_tool_callable(self, tools, tool_call):
for tool in tools:
if tool.function.name == tool_call.function.name:
module_name, func_name = tool.import_path.rsplit(".", maxsplit=1)
module = importlib.import_module(module_name)
return getattr(module, func_name)
src/banks/extensions/completion.py:128-129 (sink)
function_args = json.loads(tool_call.function.arguments)
function_response = func(**function_args)
src/banks/extensions/completion.py:181-202 (source — tools parsed from rendered template body)
for line in body.split("\n"):
try:
messages.append(ChatMessage.model_validate_json(line))
except ValidationError:
try:
tools.append(Tool.model_validate_json(line))...
2.4.3Exploitability
AV:NAC:HPR:LUI:NScope
S:UImpact
C:HI:HA:H7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HInjection
Other