An unauthenticated attacker can coerce the server into issuing HTTP requests to an attacker-chosen host by spoofing the X Forwarded-Host (and X-Forwarded-Proto) request headers. The forwarded host is used, without validation, to build the URL that server_info_update() fetches with cURL, resulting in a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) that requires no authentication.
includes/ini.php — function server_info_update() (cURL sink)vendor/vinades/nukeviet/Core/Server.php — standardizeHost() and the forwarded-header handling in the constructor (source of the tainted host)POST request containing the field __serverInfoUpdate=1, handled early in includes/ini.php before any authentication.NukeViet\Core\Server derives original_host / original_protocol from the X-Forwarded-Host / X-Forwarded-Proto headers and exposes them via getOriginalHost() / getOriginalProtocol(). These values are attacker-controlled and were not validated against the site's configured domains (my_domains).
In server_info_update() the tainted host and scheme are concatenated directly into a cURL URL:
$proto = $nv_Server->getOriginalProtocol(); // from X-Forwarded-Proto
$host = $nv_Server->getOriginalHost(); // from X-Forwarded-Host
$ch = curl_init($proto . '://' . $host . NV_BASE_SITEURL . 'index.php?response_headers_detect=1');
curl_exec($ch);
Two factors made this reliably reachable:
__serverInfoUpdate handler runs very early in includes/ini.php, before authentication, so the sink is reachable pre-auth.standardizeHost() stripped a trailing port only with the regex (\:[0-9]+)$, which is bypassed by appending a slash (e.g. 127.0.0.1:8081/): the string no longer ends in :digits, so the port survives and an arbitrary host:port reaches the cURL call.POST /index.php HTTP/1.1
Host: <victim>...
4.6.00Exploitability
AV:NAC:LPR:NUI:NScope
S:CImpact
C:LI:LA:N7.2/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:NInput Validation