GHSA-2p26-p43x-fhp8

Summary

Mint's HTTP/2 client accumulates CONTINUATION header-block fragments into a per-connection buffer with no cap on size or frame count. A malicious or compromised HTTP/2 server can drive the client's memory to arbitrary size by streaming an endless chain of CONTINUATION frames after a HEADERS frame that omits END_HEADERS, causing memory exhaustion and BEAM process death. A single connection to an attacker-controlled HTTP/2 endpoint is sufficient.

Details

When Mint's HTTP/2 receive path observes a HEADERS frame without the END_HEADERS flag, 'Elixir.Mint.HTTP2':handle_headers/3 parks the unparsed header-block fragment in conn.headers_being_processed. Every subsequent CONTINUATION frame on that stream is then appended to the accumulator by 'Elixir.Mint.HTTP2':handle_continuation/3.

Nothing in the receive path bounds this accumulator: there is no per-stream size cap, no CONTINUATION frame-count cap, and max_header_list_size is only enforced on outgoing requests (its default is :infinity, and the only enforcement helper inspects server_settings for request encoding, never inbound header blocks). Each CONTINUATION payload can be up to the peer-advertised SETTINGS_MAX_FRAME_SIZE, so the attacker can grow headers_being_processed to arbitrary size at line rate.

PoC

1. Stand up a raw TCP server that speaks the HTTP/2 handshake.
2. After the client's request HEADERS arrives, respond with a HEADERS frame on stream 1 with flags = 0 (no END_HEADERS, no END_STREAM) and an empty header-block fragment.
3. Stream CONTINUATION frames on stream 1, each with flags = 0 and a payload up to SETTINGS_MAX_FRAME_SIZE. Never set END_HEADERS.
4. The client's process memory grows linearly with the flood and the BEAM process eventually crashes with OOM.

Impact

Remote, unauthenticated denial-of-service against any process using Mint as an HTTP/2 client against an untrusted or attacker-influenced server. A single...