Claude Code validated that a target file path resided within the project working directory at permission-check time, but re-resolved the path at write time without repeating that validation. This time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) gap allowed an attacker who could write to the workspace to atomically replace a project file with a symlink, causing Claude Code to follow the symlink and write its output to an arbitrary file outside the project sandbox. Exploitation required the ability to win a race condition against the write operation and write access to the shared workspace, enabling a lower-privileged attacker to redirect benign edits to sensitive files (e.g., shell configuration) in a higher-privileged session.
Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version.
Thank you to hackerone.com/c_h4ck_0 for reporting this issue.
2.1.1292.1.1292.1.1292.1.1292.1.129Exploitability
AV:NAC:LAT:PPR:NUI:PVulnerable System
VC:HVI:HVA:HSubsequent System
SC:NSI:NSA:N7.7/CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NInput Validation