The product uses an unsigned primitive and performs a cast to a signed primitive, which can produce an unexpected value if the value of the unsigned primitive can not be represented using a signed primitive.
Although less frequent an issue than signed-to-unsigned conversion, unsigned-to-signed conversion can be the perfect precursor to dangerous buffer underwrite conditions that allow attackers to move down the stack where they otherwise might not have access in a normal buffer overflow condition. Buffer underwrites occur frequently when large unsigned values are cast to signed values, and then used as indexes into a buffer or for pointer arithmetic.
Choose a language which is not subject to these casting flaws.
Design object accessor functions to implicitly check values for valid sizes. Ensure that all functions which will be used as a size are checked previous to use as a size. If the language permits, throw exceptions rather than using in-band errors.
Error check the return values of all functions. Be aware of implicit casts made, and use unsigned variables for sizes if at all possible.
Incorrect sign conversions generally lead to undefined behavior, and therefore crashes.
If a poor cast lead to a buffer overflow or similar condition, data integrity may be affected.
Improper signed-to-unsigned conversions without proper checking can sometimes trigger buffer overflows which can be used to execute arbitrary code. This is usually outside the scope of a program's implicit security policy.
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)