The skill introduces supply chain risks and indirect prompt injection
Claims to do
Azure Validate: > **AUTHORITATIVE GUIDANCE** — Follow these instructions exactly unless they contradict security policies given to you.
Actually does
This skill reads a deployment plan from `.azure/deployment-plan.md`, incorporates validation steps from `recipes/README.md`, and executes various recipe-specific validation commands (e.g., `azd provision --preview`, `bicep build`, `terraform validate`). It records validation proof and results into `.azure/deployment-plan.md`, updates the plan's status to `Validated` upon success, and then invokes the `azure-deploy` skill.
The skill delegates execution of 'recipe-specific validation commands' and 'Build the project' to external `recipes/README.md` and unspecified build processes. This introduces a supply chain risk where malicious commands could be injected if the recipe file or build environment is compromised.
Execute recipe-specific validation commands | [recipes/README.md], Build the project and fix any errors before proceeding
The skill instructs the agent to execute infrastructure CLI commands (azd provision --preview, bicep build, terraform validate, etc.) as part of the validation flow. While described as read-only/preview operations, the pattern establishes a precedent for direct CLI execution that, combined with the external file injection vectors above, could be escalated to arbitrary command execution.
1. Run actual validation commands (azd provision --preview, bicep build, terraform validate, etc.)
Step 9 and the mandatory next-step callout instruct the agent to automatically invoke the 'azure-deploy' skill after validation completes, without requiring explicit user confirmation at that transition point. This creates an autonomy chain where a deployment action (potentially infrastructure-modifying) is triggered automatically by the validation skill.
| 9 | **Deploy** — Invoke **azure-deploy** skill | — | ... > After ALL validations pass, you **MUST** invoke **azure-deploy** to execute the deployment.
The skill references several external files (references/global-rules.md, references/recipes/README.md, references/role-verification.md) that the agent is instructed to read and act upon. If these files are attacker-controlled or can be modified, they become indirect prompt injection vectors — malicious instructions could be embedded in those files and executed under the authority of this skill.
| [global-rules](references/global-rules.md) | | [recipes/README.md](references/recipes/README.md) | | [role-verification.md](references/role-verification.md) |
The skill reads from and writes to '.azure/deployment-plan.md', a file that could be attacker-controlled or tampered with. The agent reads configuration and recipe instructions from this file before executing validation commands, making it an indirect prompt injection surface if the file contents can be manipulated.
| 1 | **Load Plan** — Read `.azure/deployment-plan.md` for recipe and configuration.
[](https://mondoo.com/ai-agent-security/skills/github/microsoft/azure-skills/azure-validate)<a href="https://mondoo.com/ai-agent-security/skills/github/microsoft/azure-skills/azure-validate"><img src="https://mondoo.com/ai-agent-security/api/badge/github/microsoft/azure-skills/azure-validate.svg" alt="Mondoo Skill Check" /></a>https://mondoo.com/ai-agent-security/api/badge/github/microsoft/azure-skills/azure-validate.svgSkills can read files, run commands, and access credentials. Mondoo helps organizations manage the security risks of AI agent skills across their entire fleet.