lambda-labs
This skill exfiltrates sensitive credentials via network commands, facilitates persistent SSH access, and lacks necessary security constraints, creating a high risk of command injection and unauthorized data exposure.
Skill Info
Install
npx skills add https://github.com/firecrawl/ai-research-skillsAssessments (4)
AI Agent Traps ↗A secret, credential, or private key read by the shell flows into a network command (curl/wget/nc), exfiltrating it off-host. The data reaches the network through a variable, a pipe, a redirection, or a process substitution. Never pipe secrets to a remote endpoint; if the upload is intentional, send a non-sensitive derived value over an authenticated, audited channel instead.
taint source (line 1): $LAMBDA_API_KEY → sink: curl -u $LAMBDA_API_KEY: \
A secret, credential, or private key read by the shell flows into a network command (curl/wget/nc), exfiltrating it off-host. The data reaches the network through a variable, a pipe, a redirection, or a process substitution. Never pipe secrets to a remote endpoint; if the upload is intentional, send a non-sensitive derived value over an authenticated, audited channel instead.
taint source (line 1): $LAMBDA_API_KEY → sink: curl -u $LAMBDA_API_KEY: \
A secret, credential, or private key read by the shell flows into a network command (curl/wget/nc), exfiltrating it off-host. The data reaches the network through a variable, a pipe, a redirection, or a process substitution. Never pipe secrets to a remote endpoint; if the upload is intentional, send a non-sensitive derived value over an authenticated, audited channel instead.
taint source (line 1): $LAMBDA_API_KEY → sink: curl -u $LAMBDA_API_KEY: \
The documentation encourages users to store API keys in environment variables and provides examples using `curl` with the key directly in the command line, which risks leaking credentials into shell history and process logs. [ensemble: confirmed by 3/3 passes; severity set to the agreed median (ADR-0067).]
curl -u $LAMBDA_API_KEY: https://cloud.lambdalabs.com/api/v1/instance-types
SSH authorized_keys injection — attempts to add persistent SSH access
echo 'ssh-rsa AAAA...' >> ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
NER model detected organization in skill content (confidence: 0.52)
C***
NER model detected organization in skill content (confidence: 0.53)
T*******
NER model detected organization in skill content (confidence: 0.57)
P******
NER model detected organization in skill content (confidence: 0.63)
c*
NER model detected organization in skill content (confidence: 0.76)
O********
NER model detected organization in skill content (confidence: 0.78)
T*********
NER model detected organization in skill content (confidence: 0.84)
L**********
NER model detected organization in skill content (confidence: 0.98)
N***
NER model detected organization in skill content (confidence: 0.99)
M**
NER model detected organization in skill content (confidence: 0.58)
S*
NER model detected organization in skill content (confidence: 0.64)
G*
NER model detected organization in skill content (confidence: 0.85)
G**
Skill executes commands, writes files, or accesses the network but declares no allowed-tools, so its tool surface cannot be reviewed or constrained.
Skill contains network access patterns (HTTP requests, socket connections) without declaring network capability in allowed-tools.
The skill provides numerous shell command templates that use variables like `$MASTER_ADDR` and `<INSTANCE-IP>`. If an agent is instructed to execute these based on untrusted input, it could lead to command injection. [ensemble: confirmed by 2/3 passes; severity set to the agreed median (ADR-0067).]
srun --nodes=4 ... --rdzv_endpoint=$MASTER_ADDR:29500
Unpinned dependency installation — package installed without version pinning
pip install lambda-cloud-client
SKILL.md links to "references/advanced-usage.md" but the file is not part of the skill package — the workflow silently degrades or the content is sourced elsewhere at runtime
[Advanced Usage](references/advanced-usage.md)
SKILL.md links to "references/troubleshooting.md" but the file is not part of the skill package — the workflow silently degrades or the content is sourced elsewhere at runtime
[Troubleshooting](references/troubleshooting.md)
The SKILL.md 'name' field does not match the skill's parent directory name, which the Agent Skills spec requires. A mismatch can confuse skill resolution or mask the skill's real identity.
lambda-labs-gpu-cloud ≠ lambda-labs
Badge
[](https://mondoo.com/ai-agent-security/skills/github/firecrawl/ai-research-skills/lambda-labs)<a href="https://mondoo.com/ai-agent-security/skills/github/firecrawl/ai-research-skills/lambda-labs"><img src="https://mondoo.com/ai-agent-security/api/badge/github/firecrawl/ai-research-skills/lambda-labs.svg" alt="Mondoo Skill Check" /></a>https://mondoo.com/ai-agent-security/api/badge/github/firecrawl/ai-research-skills/lambda-labs.svgSecure your AI agents
Skills can read files, run commands, and access credentials. Mondoo helps organizations manage the security risks of AI agent skills across their entire fleet, discover and control Shadow AI usage.
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