lambda-labs

100Critical

This skill exfiltrates sensitive credentials via network commands, facilitates persistent SSH access, and lacks necessary security constraints, creating a high risk of command injection and unauthorized data exposure.

Threat Analysis

AI Agent Traps ↗Scanned 8/20/2026
Semantic ManipulationReasoningclean
Cognitive StateMemory & Learning1 finding
SystemicMulti-Agent Dynamicsclean
Human-in-the-LoopHuman Overseerclean
HygienePackaging & Manifest3 findings

Skill Info

Namefirecrawl/ai-research-skills/lambda-labs
Registrygithub
Version7cfa204ffb6d
PURLpkg:github/firecrawl/ai-research-skills@7cfa204ffb6d?skill=lambda-labs
Stars17
Installs19
SHA-2569d1dc3fcb83b...
SHA-15ea1930acc61...
MD554c73767f90d...
TLSHd642d80b6b21...
ssdeep192:WeGQtyew...
Size12,153 bytes

Install

This skill has been flagged as potentially malicious. Review the findings below before installing.
GitHub
GitHub
19 installs
Skills.sh
Skills.shDocs
npx skills add https://github.com/firecrawl/ai-research-skills

Assessments (4)

AI Agent Traps ↗
A secret, credential, or private key read by the shell flows into a network command (curl/wget/nc), exfiltrating it off-host. The data reaches the network through a variable, a pipe, a redirection, or a process substitution. Never pipe secrets to a remote endpoint; if the upload is intentional, send a non-sensitive derived value over an authenticated, audited channel instead.criticalvulnAML.T0025AML.T0024LLM02:2025

A secret, credential, or private key read by the shell flows into a network command (curl/wget/nc), exfiltrating it off-host. The data reaches the network through a variable, a pipe, a redirection, or a process substitution. Never pipe secrets to a remote endpoint; if the upload is intentional, send a non-sensitive derived value over an authenticated, audited channel instead.

95% confidenceline 1
taint source (line 1): $LAMBDA_API_KEY → sink: curl -u $LAMBDA_API_KEY: \
A secret, credential, or private key read by the shell flows into a network command (curl/wget/nc), exfiltrating it off-host. The data reaches the network through a variable, a pipe, a redirection, or a process substitution. Never pipe secrets to a remote endpoint; if the upload is intentional, send a non-sensitive derived value over an authenticated, audited channel instead.criticalvulnAML.T0025AML.T0024LLM02:2025

A secret, credential, or private key read by the shell flows into a network command (curl/wget/nc), exfiltrating it off-host. The data reaches the network through a variable, a pipe, a redirection, or a process substitution. Never pipe secrets to a remote endpoint; if the upload is intentional, send a non-sensitive derived value over an authenticated, audited channel instead.

95% confidenceline 1
taint source (line 1): $LAMBDA_API_KEY → sink: curl -u $LAMBDA_API_KEY: \
A secret, credential, or private key read by the shell flows into a network command (curl/wget/nc), exfiltrating it off-host. The data reaches the network through a variable, a pipe, a redirection, or a process substitution. Never pipe secrets to a remote endpoint; if the upload is intentional, send a non-sensitive derived value over an authenticated, audited channel instead.criticalvulnAML.T0025AML.T0024LLM02:2025

A secret, credential, or private key read by the shell flows into a network command (curl/wget/nc), exfiltrating it off-host. The data reaches the network through a variable, a pipe, a redirection, or a process substitution. Never pipe secrets to a remote endpoint; if the upload is intentional, send a non-sensitive derived value over an authenticated, audited channel instead.

95% confidenceline 1
taint source (line 1): $LAMBDA_API_KEY → sink: curl -u $LAMBDA_API_KEY: \
Credential exposure via documentationhighcredential theftAML.T0055AML.T0037LLM02:2025

The documentation encourages users to store API keys in environment variables and provides examples using `curl` with the key directly in the command line, which risks leaking credentials into shell history and process logs. [ensemble: confirmed by 3/3 passes; severity set to the agreed median (ADR-0067).]

90% confidence
curl -u $LAMBDA_API_KEY: https://cloud.lambdalabs.com/api/v1/instance-types
SSH authorized_keys injection — attempts to add persistent SSH accesshighpersistenceAML.T0053AML.T0050LLM06:2025

SSH authorized_keys injection — attempts to add persistent SSH access

95% confidenceline 305
echo 'ssh-rsa AAAA...' >> ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
Organization name detectedmediumpii exposureAML.T0024LLM02:2025

NER model detected organization in skill content (confidence: 0.52)

52% confidence
C***
Organization name detectedmediumpii exposureAML.T0024LLM02:2025

NER model detected organization in skill content (confidence: 0.53)

53% confidence
T*******
Organization name detectedmediumpii exposureAML.T0024LLM02:2025

NER model detected organization in skill content (confidence: 0.57)

57% confidence
P******
Organization name detectedmediumpii exposureAML.T0024LLM02:2025

NER model detected organization in skill content (confidence: 0.63)

63% confidence
c*
Organization name detectedmediumpii exposureAML.T0024LLM02:2025

NER model detected organization in skill content (confidence: 0.76)

76% confidence
O********
Organization name detectedmediumpii exposureAML.T0024LLM02:2025

NER model detected organization in skill content (confidence: 0.78)

78% confidence
T*********
Organization name detectedmediumpii exposureAML.T0024LLM02:2025

NER model detected organization in skill content (confidence: 0.84)

84% confidence
L**********
Organization name detectedmediumpii exposureAML.T0024LLM02:2025

NER model detected organization in skill content (confidence: 0.98)

98% confidence
N***
Organization name detectedmediumpii exposureAML.T0024LLM02:2025

NER model detected organization in skill content (confidence: 0.99)

99% confidence
M**
Organization name detectedmediumpii exposureAML.T0024LLM02:2025

NER model detected organization in skill content (confidence: 0.58)

58% confidenceline 28
S*
Organization name detectedmediumpii exposureAML.T0024LLM02:2025

NER model detected organization in skill content (confidence: 0.64)

64% confidenceline 30
G*
Organization name detectedmediumpii exposureAML.T0024LLM02:2025

NER model detected organization in skill content (confidence: 0.85)

85% confidenceline 30
G**
Missing allowed-tools declarationlowunauthorized tool useAML.T0053LLM06:2025

Skill executes commands, writes files, or accesses the network but declares no allowed-tools, so its tool surface cannot be reviewed or constrained.

90% confidence
Undeclared network usagelowunauthorized tool useAML.T0053LLM06:2025

Skill contains network access patterns (HTTP requests, socket connections) without declaring network capability in allowed-tools.

60% confidence
Potential for command injection via shell examplesmediumprompt injectionAML.T0051AML.T0051.000AML.T0051.001AML.T0054LLM01:2025

The skill provides numerous shell command templates that use variables like `$MASTER_ADDR` and `<INSTANCE-IP>`. If an agent is instructed to execute these based on untrusted input, it could lead to command injection. [ensemble: confirmed by 2/3 passes; severity set to the agreed median (ADR-0067).]

60% confidence
srun --nodes=4 ... --rdzv_endpoint=$MASTER_ADDR:29500
Unpinned dependency installation — package installed without version pinningmediumsupply chainAML.T0010AML.T0019AML.T0058LLM03:2025

Unpinned dependency installation — package installed without version pinning

95% confidenceline 132
pip install lambda-cloud-client
Referenced file missing from skill packagelowpolicy violation

SKILL.md links to "references/advanced-usage.md" but the file is not part of the skill package — the workflow silently degrades or the content is sourced elsewhere at runtime

90% confidence
[Advanced Usage](references/advanced-usage.md)
Referenced file missing from skill packagelowpolicy violation

SKILL.md links to "references/troubleshooting.md" but the file is not part of the skill package — the workflow silently degrades or the content is sourced elsewhere at runtime

90% confidence
[Troubleshooting](references/troubleshooting.md)
Skill name does not match directoryinfopolicy violation

The SKILL.md 'name' field does not match the skill's parent directory name, which the Agent Skills spec requires. A mismatch can confuse skill resolution or mask the skill's real identity.

100% confidence
lambda-labs-gpu-cloud ≠ lambda-labs

Badge

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Image URL
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