This skill enables severe command injection and arbitrary file system access
Claims to do
Command Development for Claude Code: Slash commands are frequently-used prompts defined as Markdown files that Claude executes during interactive sessions. Understanding command structure, frontmatter options, and dynamic features enables creating powerful, reusable workflows.
Actually does
This skill provides comprehensive documentation and best practices for developing 'slash commands' for Claude Code. It details how to structure commands using Markdown and YAML frontmatter, incorporate dynamic arguments, reference files, and execute bash commands. It also covers command organization, troubleshooting, and integration with plugin-specific features like agents, skills, and hooks.
/plugin marketplace add anthropics/claude-code/plugin install command-development@anthropics/claude-codenpx skills add https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code --skill command-developmentThe skill demonstrates executing bash commands inline using backticks (`!`) and directly injecting user-provided arguments (`$1`, `$ARGUMENTS`) into these commands without explicit sanitization guidance. This creates a severe command injection vulnerability.
Run analysis: !`node ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/analyze.js $1`
Run tests: !`npm test $1`
Validate environment: !`echo "$1" | grep -E ...`The `allowed-tools` frontmatter field permits granting extensive capabilities like `Bash(*)` for arbitrary command execution and `Read`, `Write`, `Edit` for broad file system access. This significantly increases the attack surface for malicious commands.
allowed-tools: Read, Write, Edit, Bash(git:*) allowed-tools: Bash(*)
The `@` syntax allows commands to include the content of arbitrary files from the file system, including those specified by user arguments. This can be abused to exfiltrate sensitive data or gather system information.
Review @$1 for:
Compare @src/old-version.js with @src/new-version.js
@${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/config/settings.jsonThe `CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT` variable, combined with bash execution, enables commands to directly execute scripts located within the plugin's directory. This introduces a supply chain risk if a plugin is compromised or designed with malicious scripts.
Run analysis: !`node ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/analyze.js $1`
!bash ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/script.shCommands can initiate other agents or invoke specialized skills. While a legitimate feature, this capability could be abused to trigger cascading failures or unintended actions in a multi-agent system if the invoked components are malicious or poorly configured.
Launch code-reviewer agent for detailed analysis. Use the api-docs-standards skill to ensure:
The skill demonstrates argument validation but lacks explicit guidance or best practices for sanitizing user-provided arguments before they are used in bash commands or file paths, increasing the risk of injection attacks.
The sections on 'Dynamic Arguments' and 'Bash Commands' show direct injection without sanitization functions.
[](https://mondoo.com/ai-agent-security/skills/github/anthropics/claude-code/command-development)<a href="https://mondoo.com/ai-agent-security/skills/github/anthropics/claude-code/command-development"><img src="https://mondoo.com/ai-agent-security/api/badge/github/anthropics/claude-code/command-development.svg" alt="Mondoo Skill Check" /></a>https://mondoo.com/ai-agent-security/api/badge/github/anthropics/claude-code/command-development.svgSkills can read files, run commands, and access credentials. Mondoo helps organizations manage the security risks of AI agent skills across their entire fleet.