The skill forces insecure remote script execution, uses over-broad triggers to hijack agent control, and lacks necessary tool constraints, creating significant risks for arbitrary code execution and data exfiltration.
npx skills add https://github.com/EximAgent/cliThe installation instructions direct users to pipe remote scripts directly into a shell interpreter, which is a classic vector for indirect prompt injection and arbitrary code execution. [ensemble: confirmed by 3/3 passes; severity set to the agreed median (ADR-0067).]
curl -fsSL https://cli.eximagent.ai/install | sh
Remote code download and execution detected
curl -fsSL https://cli.eximagent.ai/install | sh
A remote resource is downloaded with curl/wget and piped directly into a shell interpreter (optionally via sudo). The downloaded script runs with no integrity check (no checksum/signature), so a compromised server, MITM, or hijacked URL leads to arbitrary code execution. Download to a file, verify it (e.g. sha256sum -c against a pinned digest, or a signature), then execute it.
curl -fsSL https://cli.eximagent.ai/install | sh
The instructions explicitly command the agent to ignore local file system search tools and instead use the skill's own commands, effectively isolating the agent's reasoning from the local environment. [ensemble: confirmed by 3/3 passes; severity set to the agreed median (ADR-0067).]
NEVER search local files... Call the command directly: `collection list` / `corridor list`
NER model detected location in skill content (confidence: 0.62)
U*
NER model detected location in skill content (confidence: 1.00)
G******
NER model detected organization in skill content (confidence: 0.58)
m****
NER model detected organization in skill content (confidence: 0.71)
O***
NER model detected organization in skill content (confidence: 0.56)
N**
The description and intent-map contain an extremely broad trigger list designed to capture nearly any export/import/trade mention, including vague phrases like 'any export/import/international-trade task'. This over-broad activation scope is designed to hijack agent control for tasks that could be handled by built-in tools, routing them through the eximagent CLI and its external service instead. [ensemble: confirmed by 3/3 passes; severity set to the agreed median (ADR-0067).]
"Use whenever the user mentions eximagent/this CLI/the trade CLI, or asks: find buyers / importers / distributors, look up tariffs, what HS code, sanctions check, draft cold outreach, tell me about this company website, enrich N companies, crawl these websites, show/list/manage saved collections or corridors or templates or knowledge base, trade prospect lists, or any export/import/international-trade task."
The skill mandates specific 'narration moments' for the agent, which can be used to create a false sense of transparency while masking the actual complexity or malicious nature of the underlying tool calls.
You MUST emit five narration moments. These are non-negotiable — silent multi-step runs violate the platform contract.
Skill does not specify a license field. Specifying a license helps users understand usage terms.
[](https://mondoo.com/ai-agent-security/skills/github/EximAgent/cli/eximagent)<a href="https://mondoo.com/ai-agent-security/skills/github/EximAgent/cli/eximagent"><img src="https://mondoo.com/ai-agent-security/api/badge/github/EximAgent/cli/eximagent.svg" alt="Mondoo Skill Check" /></a>https://mondoo.com/ai-agent-security/api/badge/github/EximAgent/cli/eximagent.svgSkills can read files, run commands, and access credentials. Mondoo helps organizations manage the security risks of AI agent skills across their entire fleet.