openEuler-SA-2024-1944

Synopsis:

kernel security updateSummary:

An update for kernel is now available for openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4.Description:

The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.

Security Fix(es):

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

usb: musb: tusb6010: check return value after calling platform_get_resource()

It will cause null-ptr-deref if platform_get_resource() returns NULL, we need check the return value.(CVE-2021-47181)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

btrfs: fix memory ordering between normal and ordered work functions

Ordered work functions aren't guaranteed to be handled by the same thread which executed the normal work functions. The only way execution between normal/ordered functions is synchronized is via the WORK_DONE_BIT, unfortunately the used bitops don't guarantee any ordering whatsoever.

This manifested as seemingly inexplicable crashes on ARM64, where async_chunk::inode is seen as non-null in async_cow_submit which causes submit_compressed_extents to be called and crash occurs because async_chunk::inode suddenly became NULL. The call trace was similar to:

pc : submit_compressed_extents+0x38/0x3d0
lr : async_cow_submit+0x50/0xd0
sp : ffff800015d4bc20

<registers omitted for brevity>

Call trace:
 submit_compressed_extents+0x38/0x3d0
 async_cow_submit+0x50/0xd0
 run_ordered_work+0xc8/0x280
 btrfs_work_helper+0x98/0x250
 process_one_work+0x1f0/0x4ac
 worker_thread+0x188/0x504
 kthread+0x110/0x114
 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18

Fix this by adding respective barrier calls which ensure that all accesses preceding setting of WORK_DONE_BIT are strictly ordered before setting the flag. At the same time add a read barrier after reading of WORK_DONE_BIT in run_ordered_work which ensures all subsequent loads would be strictly ordered after reading the bit. This in turn ensures are all accesses before WORK_DONE_BIT are going to be strictly...