FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the Juniper router integration plugin. The _log() function in src/juniper_plugin/fastnetmon_juniper.php (lines 117-118) constructs shell commands by concatenating the $msg parameter directly into exec() calls: exec("echo date "- {FASTNETMON] - " . $msg . " " >> " . $FILE_LOG_TMP). The $msg variable contains unsanitized data derived from command-line arguments argv[1] through argv[3], which represent the attack IP address, direction, and power. While FastNetMon's C++ core currently passes IP addresses via inet_ntoa() (which only produces safe dotted-decimal notation), the PHP script performs no input validation or shell escaping. If the script is invoked directly, by another orchestration system, or if future code changes pass string-sourced IPs, arbitrary commands can be injected. The correct fix is to replace exec() with file_put_contents() or use escapeshellarg() on all parameters.
1.1.3+dfsg-31.1.3+dfsg-41.1.3+dfsg-6build11.1.4-11.1.4-1build31.1.4-1build41.1.4-1build51.2.5-11.2.6-11.2.6-1build11.2.6-1build21.2.6-1build31.2.6-1build41.2.8+git20250911-11.2.8-1build11.2.8-1build21.2.8+git20250911-11.2.8+git20250911-1build11.2.8+git20250911-1build21.2.8+git20250911-2Exploitability
AV:NAC:LPR:LUI:NScope
S:UImpact
C:HI:HA:NCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N