A vulnerability in the tail utility of uutils coreutils allows for the exfiltration of sensitive file contents when using the --follow=name option. Unlike GNU tail, the uutils implementation continues to monitor a path after it has been replaced by a symbolic link, subsequently outputting the contents of the link's target. In environments where a privileged user (e.g., root) monitors a log directory, a local attacker with write access to that directory can replace a log file with a symlink to a sensitive system file (such as /etc/shadow), causing tail to disclose the contents of the sensitive file.
0.0.20-10.0.22-10.0.23-10.0.23-20.0.23-30.0.24-10.0.24-20.0.30-10.0.30-20.0.30-2ubuntu20.1.0+git20250711.2ba3a33-0ubuntu10.1.0+git20250711.2ba3a33-0ubuntu20.1.0+git20250711.2ba3a33-0ubuntu30.1.0+git20250711.2ba3a33-0ubuntu40.1.0+git20250801.cf79675-0ubuntu10.1.0+git20250813.4af2a84-0ubuntu20.1.0+git20250813.4af2a84-0ubuntu4+6 more0:0.10.0-1ubuntu2~26.04.10:0.10.0-1ubuntu1Exploitability
AV:LAC:HPR:LUI:NScope
S:UImpact
C:HI:LA:NCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N