A missing authentication vulnerability was found in Apache ActiveMQ Artemis. The SUBSCRIBE_TOPOLOGY_V2 handler in CoreProtocolManager.LocalChannelHandler.handlePacket() processes topology subscription requests on channel0 with zero authentication -- no call to getSecurityStore(), no credential verification, no subject validation. An unauthenticated attacker can send a single 5-byte packet on the CORE protocol (via :8080 HTTP-upgrade in EAP or :61616 in AMQ Broker) to obtain the broker's nodeID (type-1 UUID embedding MAC address), internal hostname/IP, port numbers, connector configurations, and backup/scale-down group names. In clustered deployments, a persistent ClusterTopologyListener is registered that continuously pushes all topology changes to the unauthenticated client. This contrasts with the federation handler in the same file which was fixed via ARTEMIS-5928 (CVE-2026-27446). The leaked nodeID UUID seed directly enables session-name brute-force for REATTACH_SESSION session hijack.
0:2.40.0-8.redhat_00024.1.el10eap0:2.40.0-8.redhat_00024.1.el8eap0:2.40.0-8.redhat_00024.1.el9eap0:4.1.7-1.SP1_redhat_00001.1.el10eap0:4.1.7-1.SP1_redhat_00001.1.el8eap0:4.1.7-1.SP1_redhat_00001.1.el9eap0:2.0.5-1.Final_redhat_00001.1.el10eap0:2.0.5-1.Final_redhat_00001.1.el8eap0:2.0.5-1.Final_redhat_00001.1.el9eapExploitability
AV:NAC:LPR:NUI:NScope
S:UImpact
C:LI:NA:N5.3/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N