In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by Http2MultiplexHandler as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects (HttpRequest, HttpContent, etc.) via Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec and then sent up to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling.
0:0.33.0-6.el7_90:0.33.0-8.el80:1.0.4-1.redhat_00001.1.el6eap0:1.0.4-1.redhat_00001.1.el7eap0:1.0.4-1.redhat_00001.1.el8eap0:1.68.0-2.redhat_00005.1.el6eap0:1.68.0-2.redhat_00005.1.el7eap0:1.68.0-2.redhat_00005.1.el8eap0:3.2.14-1.Final_redhat_00001.1.el6eapExploitability
AV:NAC:HPR:NUI:NScope
S:UImpact
C:NI:HA:N5.9/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N