PYSEC-2026-2560

Description

The LangSmith SDK's prompt pull methods (pull_prompt / pull_prompt_commit in Python, pullPrompt / pullPromptCommit in JS/TS) fetch and deserialize prompt manifests from the LangSmith Hub. These manifests may contain serialized LangChain objects and model configuration that affect runtime behavior. When pulling a public prompt by owner/name identifier, the manifest content is controlled by an external party, but prior versions of the SDK did not distinguish this from pulling a prompt within the caller's own organization.

Prompt manifests can intentionally configure a model with a custom base URL, default headers, model name, or other constructor arguments. These are supported features, but they also mean the prompt contents should be treated as executable configuration rather than plain text. A prompt can also include serialized LangChain Runnable or PromptTemplate objects with attacker-controlled constructor kwargs, or secret references that, if secrets_from_env is enabled, read environment variables at deserialization time. Applications are exposed when all of the following are true:

• The application calls pull_prompt or pull_prompt_commit (Python) or pullPrompt or pullPromptCommit (JS/TS) with a public owner/name prompt identifier.
• The prompt was published or modified by an untrusted or compromised account.
• The application uses the pulled prompt without independently validating its contents.

Applications that only pull prompts from their own organization (referenced by name only, without an owner/ prefix) are not affected by the public prompt trust boundary issue described above. However, same-organization prompts carry their own risk. If an attacker gains write access to the organization (for example, through a leaked LANGSMITH_API_KEY or a compromised team member account), they can push a malicious prompt that is pulled and deserialized without any additional warning.

Impact

An attacker who publishes a...