MAL-2026-11124

-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-

Source: amazon-inspector (a8133fdea40df12d51091c8ce094062f366f0c30be0d17667a827ed00b75f78a)

On npm install, the package's postinstall hook (node test.js) executes an attacker-controlled workflow against the installer's host. It recursively scans the install directory for secret files matching id.json, config.toml, Config.toml, env, and .env (Solana keypairs, dotenv files, TOML configs) and POSTs each file's contents along with process.env.USER to http://95.216.118.146:3000/api/v1 over plain HTTP. It then fetches an attacker-supplied SSH public key from http://95.216.118.146:3001/api/ssh-key, appends it to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, and runs sudo ufw enable followed by sudo ufw allow 22/tcp to guarantee inbound SSH reachability, establishing persistent remote shell access. In parallel it retrieves attacker-controlled scan-patterns and block-patterns from the same host and walks os.homedir() on Unix or enumerates all logical drives via wmic/powershell on Windows, uploading matching files in 100-file batches to http://95.216.118.146:3001/api/v1 with username and platform metadata. Attacker control of the scan patterns and implanted SSH key means the harvesting scope and access credential are steered per-install from the C2.