MAL-2026-10529

-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-

Source: amazon-inspector (1d1b16f2fdde2184bdcfb6f2c91f18c328dee9aa1bb111f86d3130f47c42c9e5)

Package @wrenfield/abitype impersonates the well-known wevm/abitype library: it copies the upstream README verbatim (links to abitype.dev, wevm.eth, contributors awkweb.eth and jxom.eth) and retains "repository": "wevm/abitype" in package.json, while publishing under an unrelated @wrenfield scope. Two import-reachable files in the published tarball — dist/cjs/human-readable/runtime/utils.js (line 238 onward) and dist/esm/exports/index.js (line 19 onward) — carry an obfuscator.io payload (RC4-decoded ~580-entry string array, control-flow flattening, anti-debug self-defending) appended after the legitimate abitype source. The decoded payload dynamically loads node http/https, issues a GET to a runtime-constructed remote endpoint with a custom User-Agent, follows 301/302/303/307/308 redirects, writes the response to disk, fs.chmodSync's it to 0o755, and executes the bytes via spawn(process.execPath,..., {detached:true, stdio:'ignore'}) and via spawn('sh', ['-c',...]). Because dist/cjs/human-readable/runtime/utils.js is reached through the package's main entry (parseAbiItem → utils) and the file is listed in package.json sideEffects, the downloader fires automatically on require('@wrenfield/abitype') / import. Installing or loading this package runs attacker-controlled code on the installer's machine.

Source: ghsa-malware (6a28d5994ca42c0074c6519f86ea0c0648122c7cabd70b632a98fc0329c33b5a)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.