MAL-2026-10391

-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-

Source: amazon-inspector (d8dda277dd82e1c50906cff18341bb76485eed33ba42d39b228c447514e4081f)

package.json declares its only runtime dependency ("safe-chain-test") as a direct tarball URL on hoped-twice-evaluation-site.trycloudflare.com — an ephemeral, anonymous Cloudflare tunnel host with no publisher identity, no version pinning, and no hash or signature verification. On npm install, npm fetches whatever bytes the tunnel operator is serving at that moment and installs the result into the dependency tree; the transitive tarball can declare its own preinstall/install/postinstall lifecycle scripts, which npm will execute against the installer's machine. The tunnel operator can swap the served content at will, so even a benign snapshot today provides no assurance about tomorrow. The package itself ships no code (the declared main index.js is absent from the tarball) — its entire install-time effect is to pull attacker-mutable code into the installer's environment.

Source: ghsa-malware (afc3164ae4341c343f4489e9e31f8031f2d3b2f1646f0c0e57b0471d6752d3e8)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.