MAL-2026-10031

The npm package @wagni_bot/orca-sdk is a supply-chain credential stealer disguised as a Orca (Solana DEX) SDK. It is one member of a coordinated campaign of 25 crypto/web3 typosquat packages published under the single npm scope @wagni_bot on 2026-07-09.

Each package declares a postinstall lifecycle hook (postinstall: node postinstall.js) that executes automatically on npm install, before the package is ever imported. The script fingerprints the host and user (os.hostname(), os.userInfo(), os.platform()), walks the user's home directory (readdirSync/readFileSync) and reads high-value secrets — SSH private keys (~/.ssh/id_rsa), cryptocurrency wallet files, and .env files (API keys, tokens, seed phrases). It then JSON-encodes the collected data and exfiltrates it to a hardcoded Telegram bot via the Telegram Bot API sendMessage endpoint (https://api.telegram.org/bot8804087989:AAHUia-5DCloXsg9M9QhffTsHO5J_6FAxQM/sendMessage). All error paths are swallowed so the install appears normal.

codelake Research proved the packages belong to one campaign deterministically: the payload file is byte-identical across all 25 packages at each published version (version-lockstep), and every package exfiltrates to the same Telegram bot token — a single automated actor. Detected and classified independently from the live npm feed on 2026-07-09; at the time of reporting the packages were still live on npm and none of the 25 were present in OSV or GHSA (a first-catch).

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Source: amazon-inspector (6fcc40768d3a7cdf73ca8664e00519e42639493a81144d6310af862b91816273)

@wagni_bot/orca-sdk@1.0.0 ships a single file, postinstall.js, which is registered as the package main and as both the preinstall and postinstall lifecycle scripts. On npm install, this script executes automatically and (1) collects host identity (os.hostname(), os.userInfo(), process.cwd()) and beacons a 'postinstall_executed'...