GHSA-xhw7-j96h-c3g5

Issue Details: YAFNET's only admin authorization gate is PageSecurityCheckAttribute, implemented as a ResultFilterAttribute that runs after the page handler completes rather than before it. No other gate exists. Any admin OnPost… handler therefore executes its side effects before the filter rewrites the response to a 302 to /Info/4. The most impactful abuse is /Admin/RunSql, whose OnPostRunQuery binds Editor from the POST body and passes it straight to IDbAccess.RunSql with no caller check, yielding arbitrary SQL execution for any low-privileged user.

A deterministic boolean-conditional time oracle was confirmed end-to-end by extracting the first character of @@VERSION: IF (ASCII(SUBSTRING(@@VERSION, 1, 1)) = 77) WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5' produced a ~5-second delay (confirming the byte is M), while IF (ASCII(SUBSTRING(@@VERSION, 1, 1)) = 76) WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5' returned immediately.

Impact: An attacker holding the lowest-privileged authenticated role, effectively an anonymous attacker on any deployment that permits self-registration, gains arbitrary blind SQL execution against the application's database, with full INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE access to every table including the Identity store (AspNetUsers, yaf_User, yaf_UserRole). This yields full loss of Confidentiality (any column extractable via the time oracle), full loss of Integrity (blind writes to identity, posts, and forum configuration, including self-promotion to HostAdmin), and full loss of Availability (DELETE/DROP/WAITFOR-driven DoS). The impact escalates out of the application's trust domain: if the underlying SQL Server instance has xp_cmdshell or CLR integration enabled (common in development and test builds), the same primitive yields OS-level command execution on the database host. Because the bypass is class-wide, every other admin handler is also callable, multiplying the blast radius across user management, XML imports, and file-writing...