The read_only mode in mcp-neo4j-cypher versions prior to 0.6.0 can be bypassed using CALL procedures.
The enforcing of read_only mode in vulnerable versions could be bypassed by certain APOC procedures.
v0.6.0 release hardened the checks around the mode. The only way to guarantee the server actions is to limit the permissions of the db credentials available to the server.
Impacts for server-side request forgery vulnerabilities may depend on both the configuration of the vulnerable system as well as the presence of other systems in the environment that could be accessed as part of exploitation.
apoc.import.file.enabled is false by defaultapoc.import.file.use_neo4j_config is true by default to restrict file imports to the import folderWe want to publicly recognise the contribution of Yotam Perkal from Pluto Security.
0.6.0Exploitability
AV:NAC:LAT:PPR:LUI:NVulnerable System
VC:LVI:LVA:NSubsequent System
SC:LSI:LSA:N2.3/CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N