A java.nio.file.Path field bound from untrusted JSON reaches JDKFromStringDeserializer.NioPathHelper.deserialize. The attacker string flows through new URI(value) → Path.of(uri), then on FileSystemNotFoundException into a ServiceLoader<FileSystemProvider> enumeration that calls provider.getPath(uri) on the first scheme-matching provider. No scheme is rejected, so untrusted JSON can drive an arbitrary registered provider under the default JsonMapper.builder().build().
Impact is bounded. The JDK built-in providers (file, jar/zipfs) do no network I/O and do not mount, so the path is inert without a side-effecting third-party provider. Binding Path from untrusted input is already an anti-pattern.
NioPathHelper.deserialize performs provider resolution driven by the attacker URI (abridged; the real method also handles a Windows drive-letter prefix and wraps failures via ctxt.handleInstantiationProblem(...)):
int colonIx = value.indexOf(':');
if (colonIx < 0) { return Path.of(value); }
...
final URI uri = new URI(value); // attacker-controlled URI string
try {
return Path.of(uri); // resolves scheme -> may load a FileSystemProvider
} catch (FileSystemNotFoundException cause) {
final String scheme = uri.getScheme();
for (FileSystemProvider provider : ServiceLoader.load(FileSystemProvider.class)) {
if (provider.getScheme().equalsIgnoreCase(scheme)) {
return provider.getPath(uri); // attacker scheme selects & drives a provider
}
}
// no matching provider -> ctxt.handleInstantiationProblem(...) (throws by default)
}
The attacker's scheme selects the provider and the attacker's URI is passed to it; the enumeration also forces provider classloading during readValue. For built-in schemes like jar:, getPath throws FileSystemNotFoundException (a mount requires explicit newFileSystem), surfacing as a wrapped...
2.21.62.22.22.18.103.1.63.2.2Exploitability
AV:NAC:LPR:NUI:NScope
S:UImpact
C:NI:NA:L5.3/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L