GHSA-rm67-g9ch-vxff

Affected software

• Product: Poweradmin (web front-end for PowerDNS)
• Version tested: master, commit 7f28c3a97 (also reachable in the 4.x release line — the record-edit code is the same)
• Component: record editing (web UI)
• Vulnerability type: Broken Access Control / Insecure Direct Object Reference

Severity

Any authenticated user who owns at least one zone can tamper with records in every other zone on the server. In a shared/multi-tenant Poweradmin install this is effectively a cross-tenant DNS takeover.

Summary

When you save a record edit, Poweradmin checks whether you're allowed to touch the record by looking at a zone id you send in the POST body, but it then applies the change to a record id you also send in the POST body. Nothing checks that the record id actually belongs to that zone id. So you point the permission check at a zone you legitimately own, point the record id at somebody else's record, and the update goes through.

A low-privilege "Editor" who only owns attacker.example was able to overwrite a record living in victim.example (owned by the admin), even though the same account gets a flat "you do not have permission to access this zone" if it tries to open that zone directly.

Where the bug is

The core mistake is in RecordManager::editRecord() in lib/Domain/Service/Dns/RecordManager.php:

// line 298 – ownership is checked against the zone id from the request
$user_is_zone_owner = UserManager::verifyUserIsOwnerZoneId($this->db, $record['zid']);
...
// line 346 – but the update targets the record id from the request
$this->backendProvider->editRecord(
    $record['rid'], $name, $record['type'], $content, $validatedTtl, $validatedPrio, $record['disabled']
);

$record['zid'] and $record['rid'] are both taken straight from the submitted form. The permission gate uses one, the write uses the other, and they're never tied together.

The backend write has no zone scoping at all —...