In affected versions, the SDK's OAuth client support (mcp.client.auth) let the MCP server a client connected to decide where the client's OAuth credentials were sent:
issuer was not validated on every discovery path, andA malicious or compromised MCP server could therefore direct them to a token endpoint of its choosing:
issuer.It would then receive the client_secret, authorization code and PKCE code_verifier meant for that real server (or, with PrivateKeyJWTOAuthProvider, a signed client assertion).
Yes, if both of these hold:
OAuthClientProvider, ClientCredentialsOAuthProvider, PrivateKeyJWTOAuthProvider or the deprecated 1.x RFC7523OAuthClientProvider as the transport's auth handler;Affected versions:
issuer check and no credential binding on any path.403 insufficient_scope.ClientCredentialsOAuthProvider and PrivateKeyJWTOAuthProvider had no way to name the authorization server their credentials belong to.Not affected:
The rating is scored for the unattended providers. With the interactive OAuthClientProvider a person has to start...
1.30.02.2.0Exploitability
AV:NAC:LPR:NUI:NScope
S:UImpact
C:HI:NA:N7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N