Quarkus HTTP path-based authorization policies can be bypassed using encoded semicolons (%3B) to smuggle matrix parameters past the security layer, and using encoded slashes (%2F) or backslashes (%5C) to access protected static resources. This is a distinct issue from CVE-2026-39852, which addressed only literal semicolon stripping.
The security layer (AbstractPathMatchingHttpSecurityPolicy) normalizes request paths using Vert.x's normalizedPath(), which only decodes unreserved RFC 3986 characters (letters, digits, -, ., _, ~). It then strips matrix parameters by looking for literal ; characters. This creates two mismatches:
%3B): Since %3B is not decoded by normalizedPath(), the matrix parameter stripping in
pathWithoutMatrixParams() never sees it. The encoded semicolon and everything after it become part of the path
segment, causing policy matching to fail. This affects all path-policy-protected endpoints.%2F (slash) and %5C (backslash) that survive the security layer's partial decoding are fully
decoded before file serving.REST endpoints using Quarkus REST (RESTEasy Reactive) are not affected by the %2F/%5C vectors because the routing layer also uses normalizedPath() — both security and routing agree on the path, so no mismatch exists.
Encoded semicolon (matrix parameter smuggling), affects all path-policy-protected endpoints:
/api/admin%3Bbypass=true/data: security sees this as a single segment admin%3Bbypass=true, which does not match the
/api/admin/* policy. The request passes through unauthenticated./api/secret%3b/data: same mechanism with lowercase hex digit....3.20.6.23.27.4.13.33.2.13.36.33.37.0Exploitability
AV:NAC:LPR:NUI:NScope
S:UImpact
C:HI:NA:N7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:NAccess Control
Authentication