Refitter emits the spec's content-type key (content map key in requestBody/responses) verbatim into a Refit [Headers("Accept: <ct>", "Content-Type: <ct>")] attribute string without escaping
". A crafted value survives Refitter's default OpenAPI validation, breaks out of the attribute and
the enclosing interface + namespace, injects a top-level file class with a [ModuleInitializer]
method, and reopens so the file stays valid. .NET runs [ModuleInitializer] methods at assembly
load, so the attacker's code executes at application startup. Verified on Refitter 2.0.0 / .NET 8.
The malicious input is a content-type KEY such as: content: { 'application/<breakout>': {schema} }.
No --skip-validation is required.
reproduce.sh (+ make_spec.py) attached: generates with default validation, compiles into a
console app, runs it (Main does not touch the client), and shows a marker written at assembly load.
Code execution at assembly load (process startup) in any application that compiles a Refitter client
generated from an attacker-controlled or attacker-influenced OpenAPI description. Estimated Critical, e.g.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N (the CNA sets the final score).
Escape every spec-derived string before emitting it into a Refit attribute (escape ", \,
reject newlines) and validate characters. We recommend auditing all attribute emissions that embed
spec-derived values, using one shared encoder.
reproduce.sh
maintainer-report.txt
make_spec.py
2.1.2Exploitability
AV:NAC:LAT:NPR:NUI:NVulnerable System
VC:HVI:HVA:HSubsequent System
SC:NSI:NSA:N9.3/CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NInjection
Input Validation