GHSA-mr34-9552-qr95

Summary

Webchat tool-result media normalization could pass local and UNC-style file paths into the host-side media embedding path without applying the configured local-root containment policy.

Impact

A crafted tool-result media reference could cause the host to attempt local file reads or Windows UNC/network path access while preparing webchat media blocks. This could disclose allowed host files or trigger network credential exposure on affected Windows deployments. Severity remains medium because exploitation depends on a tool-result media path reaching the webchat embedding path, but the sink is a host-side file read before the user sees the rendered result.

Affected versions

• Affected: >= 2026.4.7, < 2026.4.15
• Patched: 2026.4.15

Fix

OpenClaw 2026.4.15 hardens the webchat media path and the shared media resolver. Remote-host file:// URLs and Windows network paths are rejected before filesystem access, and audio embedding now enforces configured localRoots containment before stat or read operations.

Verified in v2026.4.15:

• src/gateway/server-methods/chat-webchat-media.ts uses safe file-URL parsing, rejects Windows network paths, and calls assertLocalMediaAllowed before probing local audio files.
• src/media/web-media.ts rejects remote-host file:// URLs, Windows network paths, and local-root bypasses on the shared media path.
• src/gateway/server-methods/chat-webchat-media.test.ts covers both remote-host file:// rejection and local-root denial before filesystem access.

Fix commits included in v2026.4.15 and absent from v2026.4.14:

• 1470de5d3e0970856d86cd99336bb8ada3fe87da via PR #67293
• 6e58f1f9f54bca1fea1268ec0ee4c01a2af03dde via PR #67298
• 52ef42302ead9e183e6c8810e0a04ee4ef8ae9fc via PR #67303 as defense-in-depth for trusted media passthrough anchoring

Thanks to @Kherrisan for reporting this issue.