A critical library-level vulnerability was identified in the Authlib Python library concerning the validation of OpenID Connect (OIDC) ID Tokens. Specifically, the internal hash verification logic (_verify_hash) responsible for validating the at_hash (Access Token Hash) and c_hash (Authorization Code Hash) claims exhibits a fail-open behavior when encountering an unsupported or unknown cryptographic algorithm.
This flaw allows an attacker to bypass mandatory integrity protections by supplying a forged ID Token with a deliberately unrecognized alg header parameter. The library intercepts the unsupported state and silently returns True (validation passed), inherently violating fundamental cryptographic design principles and direct OIDC specifications.
The vulnerability resides within the _verify_hash(signature, s, alg) function in authlib/oidc/core/claims.py:
def _verify_hash(signature, s, alg):
hash_value = create_half_hash(s, alg)
if not hash_value: # ← VULNERABILITY: create_half_hash returns None for unknown algorithms
return True # ← BYPASS: The verification silently passes
return hmac.compare_digest(hash_value, to_bytes(signature))
When an unsupported algorithm string (e.g., "XX999") is processed by the helper function create_half_hash in authlib/oidc/core/util.py, the internal getattr(hashlib, hash_type, None) call fails, and the function correctly returns None.
However, instead of triggering a Fail-Closed cryptographic state (raising an exception or returning False), the _verify_hash function misinterprets the None return value and explicitly returns True.
Because developers rely on the standard .validate() method provided by Authlib's IDToken class—which internally calls this flawed function—there is no mechanism for the implementing developer to prevent this bypass. It is a strict...
1.6.9Exploitability
AV:NAC:HAT:PPR:NUI:NVulnerable System
VC:NVI:HVA:NSubsequent System
SC:NSI:NSA:N8.2/CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N