The Appium storage plugin exposes an HTTP endpoint POST /storage/delete that takes a user-supplied name and deletes it from the server storage folder. The handler passes name straight into path.join(storageRoot, name) and then fs.rimraf() without any path sanitization. By sending a name containing ../ sequences, an unauthenticated remote client can escape the storage root and recursively delete arbitrary files and directories that the Appium process user can write, anywhere on the host filesystem.
The same plugin's upload path validates the name via fs.sanitizeName (requireValidItemOptions), but the delete path does not an asymmetry that makes the missing validation unambiguous.
Published build (node_modules/@appium/storage-plugin/build/lib/storage.js), and source (packages/storage-plugin/lib/):
packages/storage-plugin/lib/storage.ts:65-75 — Storage.delete():
async delete(name: string): Promise<boolean> {
if (name.toLowerCase().endsWith(TMP_EXT)) {
return false;
}
const destinationPath = path.join(this._root, name); // <-- no sanitization
if (!(await fs.exists(destinationPath))) {
return false;
}
await fs.rimraf(destinationPath); // <-- recursive delete
return true;
}
packages/storage-plugin/lib/plugin.ts:77-83 — handler passes raw body:
STORAGE_HANDLERS.deleteStorageItem = async function deleteStorageItem(req) {
return await executeStorageMethod(
async (storage) => await storage.delete(parseRequestArgs(req, ['name']).name),
);
};
parseRequestArgs (plugin.ts:94-106) only checks that the key exists; it does not validate the value.
storage.ts:53-54 add() →
requireValidItemOptions() (storage.ts:236-256) rejects any name that differs from fs.sanitizeName(name). delete() skips this entirely.1.1.6Exploitability
AV:NAC:LPR:NUI:NScope
S:CImpact
C:NI:HA:N8.6/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:NInput Validation