vm2 current head (v3.11.5, commit 7a1f5100b96f48d34e0fe104ab37c0acc5944f92) still exposes registered Node.js internal symbols from host WebStream prototypes to sandbox code.
The prior nodejs.* symbol hardening blocks Symbol.for('nodejs.<name>') at the source, but the extraction filters and bridge write traps still enumerate a fixed set of known registered symbols. On Node.js v25.8.0, stream/web exposes two additional registered symbols:
nodejs.stream.disturbednodejs.stream.erroredSandbox code can extract those real host symbols with Object.getOwnPropertySymbols(streamWeb.ReadableStream.prototype) and then use them as write keys on host objects. On a real host ReadableStream, an attacker can make stream.Readable.isDisturbed(stream) return false after the stream has already been read.
lib/setup-sandbox.js correctly blocks future nodejs.* keys at the Symbol.for() source:
if (apply(localStringStartsWith, keyStr, ['nodejs.'])) {
...
return fresh;
}
However, the extraction filters are still driven by a fixed realDangerousSymbols list. That list does not include nodejs.stream.disturbed or nodejs.stream.errored, so Object.getOwnPropertySymbols() and related paths can still return those real host symbols.
lib/bridge.js has the same fixed-list problem in isDangerousCrossRealmSymbol() and in the host-result scrub list. Because the two new symbols are not recognized, the set and defineProperty traps allow sandbox-originated writes using those keys.
Current-head source references:
lib/setup-sandbox.js:180-196 denies Symbol.for('nodejs.*') by namespace.lib/setup-sandbox.js:214-230 uses a fixed realDangerousSymbols list for extraction filtering; the two reported symbols are absent.lib/bridge.js:187-199 uses a fixed isDangerousCrossRealmSymbol() list; the two reported symbols are absent.lib/bridge.js:1499-1509 treats the write trap as the last line...3.11.7Exploitability
AV:NAC:HPR:NUI:NScope
S:CImpact
C:NI:HA:N6.8/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:NOther