A Clauster instance bound to a non-loopback address (e.g. 0.0.0.0 or a LAN IP) can serve the entire dashboard and its API without any authentication — even when the operator has configured a password — if auth.enabled is left at its default (false). The operator believes the instance is password-protected; in reality every request is served unauthenticated.
An unauthenticated attacker with network access to the instance gains full control of the dashboard: list projects, spawn/stop claude remote-control bridges in any project directory, edit CLAUDE.md, read bridge logs, and (where configured) clone repositories. Because bridges run Claude Code against the host's project directories, this is effectively remote code execution in those projects.
Loopback (127.0.0.1) deployments need no auth by design and are not affected.
All released versions (≤ 0.2.1) where all of the following hold:
host is a non-loopback address, andauth.password_required: true and/or auth.reverse_proxy.enabled: true is set, andauth.enabled is left at its default false.Docker deployments are affected: the image binds 0.0.0.0, and the previously-documented docker run command did not set auth.enabled.
Two layers checked different flags:
config.auth.enabled is true; when false it passes every request through unauthenticated.auth.password_required / auth.reverse_proxy.enabled / auth.allow_unauthenticated_network — not auth.enabled. So a config with a password but enabled=false validated, started, and enforced nothing.With host: 0.0.0.0, auth.password_required: true, a valid auth.password_hash, and auth.enabled unset:
curl http://<host>:7621/api/instances
returns 200 with the...
0.2.2Exploitability
AV:AAC:LAT:NPR:NUI:NVulnerable System
VC:HVI:HVA:HSubsequent System
SC:NSI:NSA:N8.7/CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N