The fix for GHSA-p5g2-jm85-8g35 (ClickHouse SQL injection via aggregate query parameters) added column name validation to the _aggregateBy method but did not apply the same validation to three other query construction paths in StatementGenerator. The toSortStatement, toSelectStatement, and toGroupByStatement methods accept user-controlled object keys from API request bodies and interpolate them as ClickHouse Identifier parameters without verifying they correspond to actual model columns.
ClickHouse Identifier parameters are substituted directly into queries without escaping, so an attacker who can reach any analytics list or aggregate endpoint can inject arbitrary SQL through crafted sort, select, or groupBy keys.
StatementGenerator.ts has four methods that iterate over user-provided object keys to build SQL:
| Method | Validates keys? |
|--------|----------------|
| toWhereStatement (line 292) | Yes - calls this.model.getTableColumn(key) |
| toSortStatement (line 467) | No |
| toSelectStatement (line 483) | No |
| toGroupByStatement (line 451) | No |
In Statement.ts, when a value passed to the SQL tagged template is a string, it receives the Identifier data type (line 40). Per ClickHouse documentation, Identifier parameters are substituted directly into the query without quoting or escaping. This is correct for trusted column names but unsafe for user input.
BaseAnalyticsAPI.ts deserializes sort, select, and groupBy directly from req.body (lines 239-253) and passes them to the service layer without column validation:
sort = JSONFunctions.deserialize(req.body["sort"]) as Sort<AnalyticsDataModel>;
select = JSONFunctions.deserialize(req.body["select"]) as Select<AnalyticsDataModel>;
groupBy = JSONFunctions.deserialize(req.body["groupBy"]) as...
10.0.34Exploitability
AV:NAC:LPR:LUI:NScope
S:UImpact
C:HI:HA:N8.1/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N