GET /batchdownload streams a batch ZIP to any requester who supplies its uniqid, without checking that the current user/session created it. In deployments where users have separate home directories, a valid low-privileged user who obtains an active archive id can download another user's batch archive, disclosing files the per-user boundary otherwise protects. Reported with explicit preconditions and bounded impact — not a universal "any user steals any file" issue.
The archive id is generated with plain uniqid() and no ownership metadata is bound to it before streaming.
backend/Services/Archiver/Adapters/ZipArchiver.php:44 — createArchive() uses plain uniqid().backend/Controllers/DownloadController.php:144-145 — batchDownloadStart() reads the tmpfs file by the request-supplied uniqid after only a charset preg_replace().backend/Controllers/DownloadController.php:158 — the tmpfs archive is removed only after streaming.backend/Controllers/routes.php:207-226 — both batch endpoints are exposed to normal roles with read, download, batchdownload.No user id, session id, home directory, or creator check is applied before streaming. The code path is unchanged since commit 3f03a40 (2022-05-31) and is present in the latest release v7.14.3.
Preconditions: a multi-user deployment with distinct per-user homedirs (set per-user in users.json, or private_repos => true on the WordPress/LDAP adapter). The shipped sample config (admin/guest both at /, guest with no perms) does not create this boundary on its own. Attacker is a valid user with read, download, batchdownload.
homedir /john) creates secret.txt, signs in, and creates a batch archive via POST /batchdownload. The JSON response returns the archive uniqid.homedir /jane, with batchdownload) signs in normally.GET /download of /secret.txt returns 302 — the normal...7.15.0Exploitability
AV:NAC:HPR:LUI:RScope
S:UImpact
C:HI:NA:L5.4/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:LAccess Control
Cryptography