Zebra Transparent SIGHASH_SINGLE Corresponding-Output Handling Diverges From zcashdFor V5+ transparent spends, Zebra and zcashd disagree on the same consensus rule: SIGHASH_SINGLE must fail when the input index has no corresponding output. zcashd treats this as consensus-invalid under ZIP-244, while Zebra's transparent verification path computes a digest for the missing-output case instead of failing.
The result is a direct block-validity split. A malformed V5 transparent transaction can be accepted by Zebra, retained in Zebra's mempool, selected into Zebra getblocktemplate, mined into a block, and then rejected by zcashd.
Validated code revisions used during analysis:
zcashd: 2c63e9aa08cb170b0feb374161bea94720c3e1f5Zebra: a905fa19e3a91c7b4ead331e2709e6dec5db12cbScope note:
zcashd side:
TransactionSignatureChecker::CheckSig() and SignatureHash(): zcash/src/script/interpreter.cpp.SignatureHash() explicitly throws when SIGHASH_SINGLE or SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY is used with nIn >= txTo.vout.size(): zcash/src/script/interpreter.cpp.CheckSig() catches that exception and returns false, causing the transparent script to fail.Zebra side:
4.4.0Exploitability
AV:NAC:LAT:NPR:NUI:NVulnerable System
VC:NVI:HVA:NSubsequent System
SC:NSI:HSA:N9.2/CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:N