The URL validation regex ^(https?:/)?/.* added to emissary's NavAction.java allows protocol-relative URLs (//evil.com/...) and single-slash scheme variants (http:/evil.com) to bypass validation, enabling SSRF and open redirect attacks.
Medium
CWE-918 — Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
The fix in NavAction.java (line 47) introduces a VALID_LINK pattern:
Pattern.compile("^(https?:/)?/.*")
This regex is intended to restrict navigation links to relative paths and HTTP/HTTPS URLs. However, it has multiple bypass vectors.
Protocol-relative URLs (//evil.com/...): The group (https?:/)? is optional, so the pattern reduces to //.* when the group is absent. This matches //evil.com/steal?c=SESSION, which browsers resolve to the current page's protocol plus the attacker's host.
Single-slash scheme (http:/evil.com): The regex group captures http:/ as a valid match, and browsers normalize http:/evil.com to http://evil.com, creating an open redirect to the attacker's server.
Protocol-relative to cloud metadata (//169.254.169.254/...): This enables SSRF to cloud instance metadata endpoints, which is particularly dangerous in AWS/GCP environments where IAM credentials can be retrieved.
The pre-fix code had no validation at all, accepting any URL. The fix blocks javascript:, ftp:, and data: URIs, but the protocol-relative and single-slash bypasses remain exploitable.
"""
CVE-2026-35571 - NationalSecurityAgency/emissary SSRF via NavAction
The fix in commit e2078417464b adds URL scheme validation using:
Pattern.compile("^(https?:/)?/.*")
This allows protocol-relative URLs (//evil.com) and single-slash variants
(http:/evil.com) to bypass the validation.
Tested against:...
8.51.0Exploitability
AV:NAC:LPR:HUI:RScope
S:CImpact
C:LI:LA:N4.8/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:NInput Validation