What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
Two authentication bypass vulnerabilities in MinIO's STREAMING-UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD-TRAILER code path
allow any user who knows a valid access key to write arbitrary objects to any bucket without knowing
the secret key or providing a valid cryptographic signature.
Any MinIO deployment is impacted. The attack requires only a valid access key (the well-known default
minioadmin, or any key with WRITE permission on a bucket) and a target bucket name.
There are two vulnerabilities:
Vulnerability 1 — Missing signature verification in PutObjectExtractHandler (Snowball)
When authTypeStreamingUnsignedTrailer support was added (commit 76913a9fd, PR #16484), the new auth
type was handled in PutObjectHandler and PutObjectPartHandler but was never added to
PutObjectExtractHandler. The snowball auto-extract handler's switch rAuthType block has no case for
authTypeStreamingUnsignedTrailer, so execution falls through with zero signature verification. The
isPutActionAllowed call before the switch extracts the access key and checks IAM permissions, but
does not verify the cryptographic signature.
An attacker sends a PUT request with X-Amz-Content-Sha256: STREAMING-UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD-TRAILER,
X-Amz-Meta-Snowball-Auto-Extract: true, and an Authorization header containing a valid access key
with a completely fabricated signature. The request is accepted and the tar payload is extracted into
the bucket.
Affected component: cmd/object-handlers.go, function PutObjectExtractHandler.
Vulnerability 2 — Signature verification bypass via query-string credentials
PutObjectHandler and PutObjectPartHandler call newUnsignedV4ChunkedReader with a signature
verification gate based solely on the presence of the Authorization header:...
Exploitability
AV:NAC:LAT:NPR:NUI:NVulnerable System
VC:NVI:HVA:LSubsequent System
SC:NSI:NSA:N8.8/CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N