The self-hosted todoist-mcp-http server accepts browser-origin MCP requests with attacker-controlled Host and Origin headers. A malicious website can use DNS rebinding to route its own origin to a victim's local 127.0.0.1 MCP server, then invoke Todoist MCP tools without a caller credential.
This affects github.com/Doist/todoist-mcp at commit d2903e0d945d2a559d71c091337ad6380511e62f, package version 10.3.1, when the optional Streamable HTTP server is running. The stdio entrypoint is not browser-reachable. The vulnerable browser-reachable component is todoist-mcp-http.
The documented HTTP server mode runs all MCP tools with the operator's TODOIST_API_KEY and binds to loopback by default:
TODOIST_API_KEY=your-key npx -p @doist/todoist-mcp todoist-mcp-http
src/main-http.ts:28-30 sets the HTTP bind host and port:
const PORT = Number.parseInt(process.env.PORT || '3000', 10)
const HOST = process.env.HOST || '127.0.0.1'
const LISTEN_HOST = normalizeListenHost(HOST)
src/main-http.ts:88-99 dispatches POST /mcp to StreamableHTTPServerTransport without validating Host or Origin:
app.post(
'/mcp',
requireValidTodoistToken({ type: 'static', apiKey: todoistApiKey, baseUrl }),
async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
const transport = new StreamableHTTPServerTransport({
sessionIdGenerator: undefined,
})
const server = getMcpServer({ todoistApiKey, baseUrl })
await server.connect(transport)
await transport.handleRequest(req, res, req.body)
},
)
src/middleware/require-valid-todoist-token.ts:105-117 validates the configured server-side Todoist token and then forwards the request. It does not authenticate the browser caller:
const valid = await getValidation()
if (valid) {
next()
return
}
src/mcp-server.ts:215-285 registers Todoist read and write tools against the server-side Todoist API client, including add-tasks,...
10.3.3Exploitability
AV:NAC:LPR:NUI:RScope
S:CImpact
C:HI:HA:N9.3/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N