nltk.parse.dependencygraph.dot2img invokes the Graphviz dot executable without the trusted-execution guarantees that NLTK applies to its other native-tool wrappers. The function resolves dot by bare name and then runs the resolved absolute path with a raw subprocess.run, omitting the ownership/writability check and the loader-environment scrub that nltk.pathsec.spawn_trusted provides. On a POSIX host, a local, unprivileged actor who can write to any group/world-writable directory that appears on the victim's PATH can plant a trojan dot; when the victim later renders a DependencyGraph (for example in a Jupyter notebook, which auto-invokes _repr_svg_) or calls dot2img directly, the planted binary executes as the victim. The advisory GHSA-6hwm-xvph-95vm (CVE-2026-78680) addressed the same untrusted-search-path class for the Graphviz dot invoker in nltk/translate/api.py, but dot2img received only part of that remediation and remains exploitable.
NLTK's native-tool security model layers four defenses (documented in nltk/EXTERNAL_TOOL_SECURITY.md): (1) find_binary refuses a current-working-directory-relative match; (2) resolve_trusted_executable verifies the resolved file is a regular file that no other unprivileged user can replace (private parent directories, owner is the user or root, no group/world write bit); (3) shell execution is refused; (4) safe_env scrubs loader and interpreter environment variables before exec. Layers 2, 3, and 4 are reached only through nltk.pathsec.spawn_trusted. dot2img calls find_binary("dot") (layer 1 only), then executes the result with subprocess.run([dot_binary, ...]) and no env= argument. Layer 1 rejects only non-absolute matches, so an absolute path returned by the which search stage survives even when the file lives in a writable directory. Because dot2img never calls spawn_trusted, the ownership check and environment scrub never run.
3.10.4Exploitability
AV:LAC:LPR:LUI:NScope
S:UImpact
C:HI:HA:H7.8/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H